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The Relationship between Political Parties and Their Regulators
1
 
 
Abstract 
 
Political parties are in a unique situation, being able to change electoral rules and regulations 
to minimise any potential negative effects on their electoral prospects. Attempts to influence 
regulators, however, can be complex and include voicing concerns, public pressure and the 
regulatory capture of electoral regulators. Little is known about this relationship between 
parties and their regulators. This paper focuses on this crucial electoral relationship through a 
study of political parties’ relations with the UK Electoral Commission. The first section 
addresses the background to the legal regulation of political parties. The second section 
proposes a framework through which parties’ reactions to regulation may be understood. The 
third part introduces the British case, providing evidence to demonstrate the broad utility of 
the framework. The final section analyses the issues that parties have raised with their 
regulators.  
Keywords 
 
Party Regulation; Electoral Commissions; EMBs; Electoral Integrity; UK 
 
  
3 
 
The Relationship between Political Parties and Their Regulators 
 
Political parties are in a unique situation, having the ability to directly make and change 
electoral rules and regulations while at the same time being subject to those regulations. The 
increasing levels of regulation that parties must comply with is a comparative phenomenon. 
Inroads have been made towards understanding these laws, their effects on party system 
fragmentation and public opinion. Much less is known about how parties themselves behave 
and react under legislative and regulatory regimes. Attempts to influence regulators may be 
more complex than simply changing the law, but also include voicing concerns about 
regulations, broader public pressure and, ultimately, the regulatory capture of electoral 
regulators.  The nature of the issues that political parties raise with their regulators, and the 
manner in which they are raised are therefore important for both party competition and 
electoral integrity more broadly. Pressure on regulators can impact upon the rules of the 
electoral game, benefiting some parties to the detriment of others, potentially undermining 
the electoral process. 
This paper’s major contribution is to begin to examine this crucial relationship 
between political parties and their regulators. It proposes a framework through which party 
behaviour can be assessed, while also providing an empirical insight into the issues raised by 
parties with their regulators. It approaches this through a study of political parties’ relations 
with the UK Electoral Commission. The UK is an excellent case study. Although an 
established democracy, it is relatively new to the regulation of political parties, with major 
legislation only introduced from 2000 onwards. This provides evidence of the various ways 
in which parties react to their regulators as they are becoming used to a new regulatory 
regime.  
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The article proceeds as follows. The first section provides a general overview of the 
legal regulation of political parties. The second section proposes a framework through which 
parties’ reaction to such regulation may be understood. The third part introduces the British 
case and demonstrates the broad utility of the framework. The final section analyses the 
issues that parties in the UK have raised with regulators, and classifies these in relation to 
their impact upon electoral integrity. The conclusion brings out the implications. 
 
Background  
 
Political parties are increasingly subject to various laws and regulations. Three reasons can be 
traced to explain this: to set out specific roles for political parties; to bolster the legitimacy of 
parties when this has declined through various misdeeds; and to oversee the use of state 
subisdies (Katz and Mair, 1995; Rashkova and van Biezen, 2014; van Biezen, 2012). Parties 
are influenced by different types of laws. At the most fundamental level, these include 
constitutional provisions. Also affecting parties are specific party laws, laws that regulate 
electoral conduct, and laws relating to party financing, whether public or otherwise. Gauja 
(2010) also notes the impact of case law on party politics, particularly in Common Law 
democracies such as the USA, Australia and the UK.  
The regulatory bodies that tend to oversee parties on a daily basis are Electoral 
Management Bodies (EMBs) or Electoral Commissions. Autonomous EMBs are generally 
held to improve the quality of elections. One prominent typology proposes three categories of 
EMB organisation: as part of a government office or agency; as part of a government agency 
but under supervisory authority; or a fundamentally independent organization (Birch, 2011: 
Ch.6; Elklit and Reynolds, 2001; International IDEA, 2006). Distinctions between de jure and 
de facto autonomy are crucial. Consequently, classification of political parties’ formal role 
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vis-à-vis EMBs has also been of concern (Elmendorf, 2006; Hartlyn et al, 2008; Rosas, 
2010). Birch (2011: 116) labels EMBs wholly independent of parties the ‘ombudsman 
model’, while those with some form of party involvement in the selection of commissioners, 
the ‘checks and balance’ or ‘party watchdog’ model. Hartlyn et al. (2008) identify four types 
of formal EMB-party models: single-party dominated; partisan mixed; independent/partisan 
mixed; independent of parties. Beyond these classifications, little is known about EMBs, their 
operations and regulatory activity over and interactions with political parties (Elmendorf, 
2006; Norris, 2014: 12-14).           
Laws and regulations can impact on various aspects of party activities, and different 
levels of parties’ organisations (van Biezen and Borz, 2012). Rules which target parties 
generally can have an impact upon the broader conduct of party competition. A number of 
authors highlight the importance of addressing how permissive or prohibitive laws affecting 
party competition are (Katz and Mair, 1995; Molenaar, 2014). The more open or permissive 
party laws are, the fewer impacts they have on party organisation, and the more open party 
competition will be. James (2010a) extends this notion of permissiveness beyond parties to 
electoral laws and reforms which seek to encourage, or restrict, voter turnout, arguing that 
such electoral laws can often be implemented by parties seeking partisan advantage (James, 
2010b). Restrictions on who can register to vote, how those votes are cast, deposits for 
candidates, and laws on who can stand for office and the number of nominations they need 
can all impact on issues ranging from candidate selection through to campaign activity, and 
also impact upon electoral competition. Electoral law is therefore a crucial part of the picture 
in understanding how parties might attempt to ‘change the rules of the game’ through their 
interactions with the EMBs that regulate them.                                   
Three main paradoxes can be identified in the relationship between parties and their 
regulators. Firstly, parties are effectively in a dual role as both governors and governed. In 
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most democracies, and assuming the law in question is not constitutional, should they not like 
a particular law, they are often in a position to change the law in question (Gauja, 2010). 
While some EMBs have the power to make binding regulations, or have a consultative role in 
the legislative process, more normally it falls to parties in parliament to change electoral 
legislation. They can choose to support or ignore EMB recommendations (International 
IDEA, 2006: Ch. 3). Secondly, the increasing volume of regulation brings into question the 
extent to which political parties should be seen as private voluntary associations or as public 
bodies. This is particularly the case when related to state financing, but not exclusively so; 
rules on ballot access and candidate selection may also bring these issues into focus (e.g. 
Gauja, 2010; Morris, 2012; Rashkova and van Biezen, 2014; van Biezen, 2004). Political 
scientists have largely treated parties as voluntary organisations, something which often 
appears unjustified when the effects of party laws are taken into account (but see Orr, 2012). 
Thirdly, there is a tension between using party or electoral legislation to rectify imbalances 
and injustices in electoral politics, and the potentially entrenched interests of those in power 
who must legislate to resolve these imbalances (Gauja, 2010).  
The constitutionalisation of party politics, party funding regulations and party links to 
the state are all well documented (van Biezen, 2012; van Biezen and Borz, 2012; van Biezen 
and Kopecky, 2007; 2014). The effects of these laws have also been examined, particularly in 
relation to party system effects and public opinion on party legitimacy (Gauja, 2010; 
Molenaar, 2014; Rashkova and Van Biezen, 2014; van Biezen, 2004; Whiteley, 2014).  
Largely absent in most of these discussions is a framework for understanding how 
political parties react to and interact with their regulators. How might parties respond to 
regulations they dislike? What issues do they make representations to their regulators about? 
This is surprising given the otherwise generally robust theorisation of party behaviour. It is to 
developing such a framework that the next section now turns. 
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Parties, Regulatory Capture and Voice     
              
EMB practitioners often view political parties as ‘stakeholders’ in their regulatory activity 
(International IDEA, 2006: Ch. 8). With party scholars, the predominant approach to 
understanding party behaviour is as actors aiming to maximise a range of interests, whether 
votes, policy or office (e.g. Strom, 1990). The electoral function is crucial; without votes, 
parties are unlikely to be able to influence policy or place candidates in office. 
 Given such rational choice underpinnings, adapting Hirschman’s (1970) ‘exit, voice 
and loyalty’ model may help conceptualise the relationship between political parties and their 
regulators. In party studies, this is often applied to the loyalty or otherwise of party members 
to changing party programmes. However, Hirschman’s model relates more generally to how 
organisations respond to deterioration in conditions affecting them. Introducing regulatory 
regimes has already been highlighted as a common response to systemic perceptions of 
deteriorating party legitimacy (Rashkova and van Biezen, 2014).  
 The key tension is whether regulation is implemented for the public good, or for the 
benefit of the parties which are regulated (Stigler, 1971: 3). A crucial question is how parties 
respond when they no longer feel that the regulatory regime or regulation on certain issues is 
suitable for their needs. This is a case of what Hirschman (1970: 98-105) calls the ‘difficult 
exit from public goods’. Given that systems of public regulation and oversight to govern 
parties have been set up, generally with the support of most if not all mainstream parties in a 
country, it is then extremely difficult for parties to exit from that regulatory regime without 
experiencing high costs, such as restrictions on their ability to nominate candidates, or a 
further deterioration in party legitimacy, for example. One form of exit may however be 
available to parties, and this is returned to below. 
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 In theory, parties must seem to be loyal to the regulatory regime they have created. 
Difficulties and high costs involved in leaving such a regime mean that ‘voice’ becomes the 
main way that parties have to rectify any perceived deficiencies in the laws and regulations 
they are governed by.
2
 Hirschman (1970: 33-34) refers to voice under such circumstances as 
the dominant reaction mode, noting that ‘with exit … unavailable, voice must carry the entire 
burden of alerting management to its failings’. Voice therefore dominates in the interactions 
political parties have with their regulators. Hirschman (1970: 30) defines voice as: 
 
[A]ny attempt to change, rather to escape from, an objectionable state of affairs, 
whether through individual or collective petition to the management directly in charge, 
through appeal to a higher authority with the intention of forcing a change in 
management, or through various types of actions and protests including those that are 
meant to mobilize public opinion. 
 
A number of issues flow from this. Firstly, where there are few actors, voice is likely to 
be a powerful mechanism, as major players in a market can wield significant influence 
(Hirschman, 1970: 41 & 70). This is the case in regulation of political parties; normally the 
number of mainstream parliamentary parties is limited, giving them considerable weight in 
their dealings with regulators. Secondly, those with most to lose are likely to have most to say 
on the issues they feel important (Hirschman, 1970: 49). Evidence from party competition is 
readily available as parties seek to maximise their gains or limit their competitors’. For 
example, Republicans in the US are more vociferous on tightening registration and voter ID 
rules than Democrats, who are more outspoken on how such rules can be used as a form of 
voter suppression.  
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Thirdly, a balance needs to be struck between being too outspoken, thereby creating 
discontent and hostility within the regulatory regime, or minimising complaints so as to 
continue to work towards collective goals (Hirschman, 1970: 63, 70 & 103). For parties, there 
will be a ‘tipping point’ at which their electoral needs outweigh those of their competitors in 
the broader party system. Finally, there will usually be some form of expelling or disciplining 
members of a regime or market who become too outspoken (Hirschman, 1970: 76). In the 
electoral field this is likely to take the form of enforcement action against the wayward party 
or candidate to resolve the breach of regulations.  
 The notion of voice, with these associated qualifications, permits an exploratory 
model of party behaviour under regulatory regimes to be proposed. Given the lack of research 
on the topic, this is necessarily somewhat developmental. Party-regulator interactions are 
complex, and more than just a straightforward dichotomy between compliance and non-
compliance. Instead, this reflects a range of behaviour which takes place in two broad 
settings, the institutional and the extra-institutional.  
Most normal interaction is likely to be relatively mundane and institutionalised, 
whether through formalised meetings, or more informal contacts and representations. Such 
contacts are classic conditions for regulatory capture of EMBs by the political parties they 
regulate.
3
 Bo (2006: 203) suggests broad and narrow definitions for this. Broadly, this relates 
to the process through which special interests affect state regulation. More narrowly, this is 
the process through which regulated monopolies or oligopolies end up manipulating state 
agencies that oversee them. Given the limited number of relevant parties in most party 
systems, analogous to oligopoly, this narrower definition is most appropriate for assessing 
party-EMB interactions.   
This is an institutionalised type of voice in which both sets of actors have influence. 
Regulated bodies have detailed information which regulators need to undertake their 
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activities. This information may not be complete, can be withheld, or only partially disclosed. 
Without this information, regulators are restricted in their ability to execute their functions. 
Regulators are ‘captured’ because they are dependent upon the organisations they regulate 
(Agrell and Gautier, 2012).
4
 Nonetheless, regulators can implement various approaches 
which make the activities of regulated bodies more, or less, costly (Agrell and Gautier, 2012; 
Bo, 2006; Leaver, 2009; Stigler, 1971). Mostly, interactions take place behind closed doors. 
On occasions, capture may be more obvious, for instance, where parties have personnel 
nominated to serve on Electoral Commissions and regulatory bodies.  
Moving to the extra-institutional area, where such behind the scenes voice may not 
have had an effect, parties may make their views known through the media. They may also be 
more persistent in organising a more sustained public campaign on various issues, such as, 
for example, issues to do with candidate nomination or voter registration.  
In both institutional and extra-institutional arenas, considerable dissatisfaction leads to 
pressures on the regulatory regime. Relatively rare events such as enforcement activity, legal 
challenges, fines and court cases ensue in the institutional arena. More problematically, 
attempts by parties to change laws reflect an attempt to move from one regime and set of 
electoral institutions or regulations to another. This is the sense in which parties have a 
limited form of exit available to them. To exit from one set of rules to another, they need to 
legislate for reforms, usually after other efforts to express their opinions may have failed or 
external circumstances force change upon them. Exit is therefore expressly and more 
narrowly related only to the party law and regulation causing disquiet in the first place, not to 
the broader idea that party conduct needs to be regulated. 
Analytically, parties are most likely to exercise increasing levels of voice when costs 
of regulation and dissatisfaction with the regulatory regime increase. Two additional factors 
require consideration. Firstly, parties are more likely to speak out when an opportunity occurs 
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to pushback against regulation, or show their competitors in a bad light. Additionally, the 
probability of having success in attracting public attention for the case being made is also 
important. Some of these different factors will be more important at some points than others. 
To develop regulatory leeway, a party may respond to opportunities that emerge, even if 
regulation is not necessarily imposing excessive costs. Thus, what might be termed 
generically regulatory discontent with the legislative regime also involves the interaction of 
costs and opportunities.  
 
(Figure 1 about here)  
 
Figure 1 suggests how this is likely to work. Institutionalised regulatory capture is the 
default setting. As discontent rises for a party, the likelihood that they will use increasingly 
public forms of voice also rises. The various types of voice are not necessarily mutually 
exclusive and may overlap. For instance, institutionalised interaction is likely to continue, 
even as a party raises issues with the media or may even campaign around that particular 
issue. As the regulator takes the party’s (or parties’) concerns into account, general discontent 
will wane and relations revert back to a normal regulatory capture relationship.  
This framework ought to be comparatively applicable. Fisher and Eisenstadt’s (2004: 
623) comparative discussion notes the ‘inability or unwillingness of parties … to comply 
with the spirit of legislation’. Nassmacher (2003) observes that resistance to regulation has 
been the norm across many different countries’ regulatory regimes on party funding and 
competition, and various different types of democracy. Moreover, ‘those being regulated will 
work to narrow the definitions (of legislation) in order to create some leeway’ (Nassmacher, 
2003: 153).         
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How does this affect the behaviour of regulators? The confidence of the parties being 
regulated in the regulatory regime is crucial (International IDEA, 2006: Ch. 8). To avoid 
extreme examples of voice, and to ensure the success of the regime and the interests and 
goals of their organisation, regulators will also have a gradated set of responses to issues 
raised by parties. In similar vein to the spectrum for party behaviour, this is likely to begin 
with institutionalised and responsive relations through the extensive provision of information, 
regular meetings and contacts. Both sides have more to gain from such an approach which 
seeks to minimise voice (Leaver, 2009).
5
 Only in the unlikely event of these failing are rarer 
measures such as exposure, enforcement activity and ultimately legal challenges likely to be 
initiated.  
What issues are likely to make parties utilise voice in their relations with regulators? 
The key motivations of firms in regulatory environments are to achieve: money; control over 
entry by new rivals; policies affecting substitutes or complements; and price-fixing (Stigler, 
1971: 4-6). Some of these are clearly applicable to political parties, who have been known to 
seek public financing, higher electoral thresholds and prohibitive rules on party regulation. 
Van Biezen and Kopecky (2014: 176) offer a range of areas where laws affect parties, mainly 
in relation to party organisation. However, the crucial vote-seeking function of parties means 
that issues focused upon the electorate and electoral laws must also be taken into account, not 
just laws which impact upon parties.  
Literature on electoral integrity helps identify crucial electoral law issues which may 
form the basis of interactions between parties and regulators. Numerous frameworks for 
judging this have been offered (e.g. Bland et al, 2013; Pastor, 1999; Mozzafar and Schedler, 
2002; Norris et al., 2013). All cover similar indicators throughout the electoral cycle. Elklit 
and Reynolds (2005) highlight eleven broad areas. Unlike comparable frameworks, they 
weight them in regard to their importance to electoral integrity. Areas covered include: the 
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legal framework; the performance of the EMB; polling district demarcation; voter education; 
voter registration; ballot paper access and design; campaign regulation; polling processes; 
vote counting and tabulation; resolving post-election disputes; and post-election procedures.  
 
  
The British Case 
Britain is interesting for examining the relationship between political parties and their 
regulators. Until 1998 political parties were not constitutionally recognised. Aside from 
specific electoral laws, mainly imposing obligations on candidates, party conduct was largely 
unregulated. The period from 1998 onwards has seen increasing legislation and regulation 
affecting political parties. How parties, and regulators, in an advanced democracy such as 
Britain react to the extension of new restrictions and regulations on their activities is therefore 
a matter of some interest.   
The most significant law was the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums (2000) 
Act (PPERA) (Fisher, 2001; 2002). This established an Electoral Commission responsible for 
registration and regulation of parties and party finance. Its remit included oversight of 
electoral laws, regulation of party accounts, donations and funding, and oversight of election 
spending limits. This was supplemented by subsequent legislation in the Electoral 
Administration Act (2006) and the Political Parties and Elections Act (PPEA) 2009 which 
strengthened the Electoral Commission’s enforcement powers. Article 28 of PPERA 
privileges the electoral function by indicating that contesting elections is a crucial expectation 
of registering as a political party. Prospective parties must submit their constitution or rule-
book as part of their application, leading to suggestions that this represents ‘statutory 
incorporation’ of party organisational processes such as candidate selection (Morris, 2012: 
122).   
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Passing PPERA was possible because legislative proposals had all-party support, and 
were seen as a way of restoring confidence in the aftermath of a range of funding scandals in 
the 1990s. The Electoral Commission was to report to parliament, but to act independently. 
The model initially chosen was the non-partisan ‘ombudsman’ model with Electoral 
Commissioners barred from having undertaken recent partisan activity. The Commission was 
to have enforcement powers to compel information on donations, expenditure and party 
accounts with it being the Commission’s responsibility to initiate proceedings. Ewing (2001: 
13) indicated that the Commission’s challenge was: 
 
to operate in a manner which simultaneously maintains the goodwill of the regulated 
community and satisfies the legitimate expectations of the public and press that it will 
be an effective watchdog prepared to bare its teeth and if necessary bite hard. 
 
  Challenges to parties were threefold. Firstly, with regulations on party accounts 
impacting not just upon party headquarters but also party ‘accounting units’, PPERA was 
thought to have ‘potentially onerous obligations on political parties which will require 
sophisticated reporting mechanisms in place’ (Ewing, 2001: 5). Secondly, consequently, 
PPERA was likely to lead to party professionalization and centralisation to comply with 
legislative obligations. Thirdly, there was a danger that the non-partisan nature of 
Commissioners might lead to a body ill-informed about the challenges faced by parties, open 
to influence by government and essentially ineffective (Ewing, 2001; Fisher, 2001).  
 The Committee on Standards in Public Life (CSPL) (2007; Ghaleigh, 2012) reviewed 
the operation of the Electoral Commission after the 2005 general election. CSPL made a 
number of criticisms, and recommended a narrower focus on two issues: free and fair 
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elections through electoral administration; and promoting healthy and competitive political 
parties.  
Five issues concern the discussion to hand. Firstly, CSPL implied that there had been 
pressure on the Electoral Commission. As CSPL argued, the Commission ‘must accept it will 
not always be popular with the parties and that pressure, overt and covert, will always be 
applied in attempts to influence its approach’ (CSPL, 2007: 2).  Secondly, CSPL noted a 
degree of timidity on the part of the Electoral Commission in acting upon issues in party 
funding, particularly in relation to the ‘cash for honours’ scandal, discussed below. Thirdly, it 
suggested that the decline in confidence was not solely the fault of the Electoral Commission, 
but in part due to government and political parties ignoring the Commission’s advice. 
Somewhat contradictorily, it also suggested that the parties themselves were losing 
confidence in the Commission.
6
 Fourth, it accepted an often-made party argument that much 
of the work necessary to comply with regulatory demands is the responsibility of voluntary 
treasurers and personnel, to which the Commission ‘must be sensitive and proportionate’ 
(CSPL, 2007: 2). Finally, CSPL indicated that the non-partisan ‘ombudsman model’ of 
Electoral Commission meant that the regulator had been deprived of recent party political 
experience to help it implement its remit. 
It is possible to suggest from this and from other evidence that parties have attempted 
to exploit loopholes in legislation or otherwise push back against it in the manner set out 
above. Some examples make the point, and affect most parties. Firstly, against the backdrop 
of a generally ‘toxic relationship between the Labour Party and Electoral Commission’ 
(Ghaleigh, 2012: 160), the 2006 ‘cash for honours’ case suggested that Labour had received 
sizeable loans from individuals who were subsequently nominated for peerages in the House 
of Lords. According to the party’s former General Secretary, ‘often we forgot that the 
measures the government passed [PPERA] actually applied to us as well’, (Watt, 2010: 37). 
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While a police investigation did not press charges, and their nominations were rejected, 
Labour were not the only party that had exploited loopholes by using loans as a method of 
funding (Fisher, 2009). The importance of information in the relationship between parties and 
regulators is highlighted by this case. The Electoral Commission could clearly not execute its 
functions properly without appropriate information. Yet Watt (2010: 38) makes the 
remarkable admission that Labour’s 2005 election return to the Commission ‘was the first 
accurate one we’d ever filed’, explaining this through administrative inertia and oversights 
within the party.  
Secondly, the Electoral Commission have been on the receiving end of heavy 
criticism and pressure from political parties. Electoral Commission Chair, Jenny Watson, was 
widely reported as having been ‘smeared’ by the Conservative-led Department of 
Communities and Local Government when she was not re-appointed to a post with a separate 
body, the Audit Commission, in September 2010 (Curtis, 2011; Singleton, 2011). This had 
the potential to undermine the Electoral Commission in the aftermath of widely-publicised 
polling station difficulties in the 2010 general election, something which the Commission had 
no actual power of direction over, but which clearly provided an opportunity for criticism. 
More directly, in 2015, former Scottish National Party leader and First Minister Alex 
Salmond explicitly claimed the Commission was ‘not fit for purpose’ after controversial 
changes to electoral registration procedures and that, in Scotland, its powers should be 
transferred to the Scottish parliament (Salmond, 2015).  
Thirdly, parties have pushed back against proposals to regulate their conduct. For 
example, Northern Irish parties have resisted attempts to put the regulation of their donations 
on the same transparency footing as parties in Britain, citing security fears as the reason. 
Similarly, PPEA 2009 allowed candidates across the UK to withhold their addresses from 
publication. Such moves had been resisted previously, even at a time of higher terrorist 
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threat. In 2009, the majority of party politicians responding to the consultation on the issue 
were in favour of withholding information, while electoral administrators and the majority of 
responses from the public had been in favour of retaining disclosure (White, 2009). Similarly, 
despite several proposals to reform party financing further, the major parties have also failed 
to agree over issues of limits to donations and controlling party spending. This has halted any 
reform of party funding (Fisher, 2009), and underlines the difficulty of the Electoral 
Commission pushing for significant reforms in the regulatory regime without the agreement 
of the parties.. 
Fourth, parties can also influence regulation through institutionalised discussions, 
which are classic conditions for regulatory capture. Johnston (2014) highlights how parties 
have attempted to influence the work of another key electoral regulator, the Boundary 
Commission, to their advantage. They have done so by a process he labels ‘gerrymandering 
by consultation’, which involves providing detailed proposals and information to local 
redistricting enquiries. The suggestion is that this has been done for partisan advantage, and 
that parties have had success at different times; Labour in the mid-1990s, the Conservatives 
more recently. 
Fifth, under post-1997 Labour governments, numerous ‘electoral modernisation’ 
measures meant that the electoral process in the UK came under increasing pressure (James 
(2010b). In addition to PPERA, these included the Representation of the People Act 2000, 
permitting universal postal voting on demand, and the European, Parliamentary and Local 
Elections (Pilots) Act 2004 which extended pilot schemes to European parliament elections. 
The stated intention behind changing these electoral laws had been to increase participation. 
James (2010b) suggests that this was less motivated by altruistic motives than by narrow 
party interest, Labour standing to benefit most from rising turnout.       
18 
 
Finally, following recommendations made by CSPL, PPEA 2009 also permitted 
political parties to nominate four electoral commissioners. Although they sit on a non-
partisan basis, this is bound to have changed the dynamics around the regulation of parties 
and caused concern when proposed (Elmendorf, 2006: 427). This may not be a bad thing 
however. As Birch (2011: 116) observes more generally, ‘most scholars recognise that 
electoral commissioners selected on a partisan basis are capable of performing their duties in 
a professional, non-partisan manner’. 
This evidence shows parties attempting to pushback against regulation, and using 
voice to influence regulators. The trend has been to mix attempts at pushback through voice, 
with steps towards often seemingly reluctant compliance. All mainstream parties now have a 
senior official responsible for compliance with legislation. In the Electoral Commission’s 
party risk profiles, reported since 2010 as a result of PPEA 2009, all mainstream parties, 
including the Scottish and Welsh nationalists have been classified as having high levels of 
compliance.
7
 Smaller parties are less compliant. Both UKIP and the Green Party have 
moderate levels of compliance, while the British National Party consistently demonstrates 
low levels of compliance. 
 
Party – Regulator Discussions 
       
What issues form the basis of formal discussions between parties and the Commission? In 
accord with best practice for EMB-stakeholder relations (International IDEA, 2006: Ch. 8), 
since its inception, the Electoral Commission established formal political parties’ panels for 
each of the four key UK institutions –Westminster and Scottish parliaments, and the Northern 
Irish and Welsh Assemblies. Their remit is to discuss matters of importance to the parties. 
Minutes of these meetings are publicly available.
8
 These represent a public version of 
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discussions and, naturally, cannot capture any informal discussions which may take place 
outside these meetings. They are nevertheless an important public record agreed between 
parties and the Commission and therefore a key primary source when trying to establish the 
nature of interactions between UK parties and their chief regulator. 
Panels normally meet 3-4 times per year. Attendance varies. The Electoral 
Commission is always well represented, with an average of 4-5 personnel per meeting. These 
are normally high level participants, such as the local Head of Office and Electoral 
Commissioner, the Chief Executive and those with particular responsibilities such as electoral 
administration or party funding.  
Some parties are better attenders than others. The worst attended meeting was a 
Welsh panel in October 2007, when only two party representatives attended, one each for 
Plaid Cymru and the Conservatives, but were outnumbered by four Commission 
representatives. The worst attending parties between 2007 and early 2014 were: the 
Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) who missed over a quarter of meetings; Alliance Party 
who missed around two fifths of meetings, both from Northern Ireland; the Scottish 
Conservatives who missed almost a third of meetings; and Plaid Cymru, who missed more 
than half of the Westminster panel meetings. None of the Northern Irish parties attend the 
Westminster panel, despite being represented in the UK parliament. Some parties have 
perfect attendance records: the SNP with the Scottish panel, Conservatives at Westminster 
and Wales, and the Liberal Democrats at Westminster. With the exception of Wales, the other 
three panels also had consistent participation from the Green Party. 
Table 1 provides an assessment of how regularly various topics were brought up in 
these meetings. Following a close reading of the meeting minutes, topics discussed in each 
separate numbered paragraph in the minutes were coded in line with each of the eleven areas 
set out in Elkit and Reynolds’ (2005) framework for election quality. These were coded in 
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order of presentation in the framework outlined above. Thus, discussion of the legal 
framework, the first category, was coded 1, through to post-election procedures, which were 
coded 11. For example, lengthy discussion of registration procedures (NI Panel, January 
2007) was coded 5 under voter registration.  
Allowance was made for British circumstances under these generic headings. 
Although Elklit and Reynolds (2005) do not include enforcement policy, for the purposes of 
this analysis it is included under the legal framework as this is the most appropriate category 
to situate it. Similarly, following Norris’s (2014: 12-14) discussion which broadens this 
category, electoral management is broadened from concerns solely about the national EMB to 
other bodies involved in regulating and implementing electoral law. Under the category of 
access to and design of the ballot paper, issues regarding candidate nomination, central to 
ballot access, have been included even if not explicitly outlined in the original election 
quality framework. 
 
(Table 1 about here)                           
 
Elklit and Reynolds (2005: 155) separate these issues into three categories for 
established democracies: essential; important; and desirable. Issues classed as ‘essential’ are 
discussed overall perhaps slightly less often than might be expected, suggesting that they may 
not be quite as important to parties in their regular dealings with Commission officials as the 
term ‘essential’ implies from an electoral integrity perspective. Thus, the most regularly 
discussed ‘essential’ issue is polling processes at 85% of meetings, while ballot access and 
the legal framework were discussed at around four-fifths of all meetings. Vote counting 
processes were discussed in only just over half of all meetings, but were clearly more 
important in Scotland where they were discussed on almost every occasion.  
21 
 
Of issues classed as ‘important’, the predominant concern among parties was voter 
registration, discussed in 86% of all meetings, although evidently more an issue in Northern 
Ireland and Wales than in Scotland. Electoral management was also regularly discussed, in 
around four-fifths of all meetings. The other ‘important’ issues were of less concern: 
constituency demarcation on only 36% of occasions, although clearly of much more 
relevance to issues in Scotland; and resolving disputes seldom discussed in any of the panels. 
Predominant among issues classed as ‘desirable’ were issues of campaign and funding 
regulation, discussed in 90% of meetings. Both voter education and post-election procedures 
and reports were discussed in around three fifths of meetings overall, but were clearly 
discussed more regularly in Scotland and Wales.  
A qualitative reading provides a clearer sense of these discussions. A number of 
points are evident. Firstly, and unsurprisingly, the bulk of discussion has the appearance of 
routine and often very technical business. Often information is related to technical issues 
about parties’ reporting requirements and Commission systems for doing so. Some issues are 
briefly passed over, while others are dwelt upon for longer. Parties at Westminster often 
appear to discuss some issues in greater depth than the other panels. For example, the 
September 2012 Westminster meeting was dominated by three subjects: the legal framework; 
campaign and funding regulation; and polling processes. Timing also matters, with certain 
issues more prominent in the run-up to or immediate aftermath of elections, or boundary 
demarcation when a boundary review is imminent. For example, both registration issues and 
public information are regularly addressed in the run-up to elections (e.g. Scottish Panel, 
March 2007; Westminster Panel, Sept. 2013)   
Secondly, often meetings have the flavour of being information passing sessions from 
the Electoral Commission to the parties. This is particularly the case in Northern Ireland, 
where minutes regularly commence by stating that ‘no issues had been raised by the parties in 
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advance of the meeting’ (e.g. April 2012). In other cases, the Commission is clearly 
reiterating its organisation and responsibilities to parties (e.g. Welsh Panel, February 2007). 
Thirdly, parties appear to appreciate the opportunity to discuss matters of interest in 
these panels, a viewpoint expressed particularly by the Scottish panel in December 2007. 
There is nevertheless on occasion some evidence of party competition in the discussions. For 
instance, discussion of regulating party and accounting units’ statement of accounts 
(Westminster panel, September 2012) has the Conservative representative, supported by 
Labour and Liberal Democrats, suggesting that such regulation is not necessary, while the 
SNP, following strong CSPL recommendations, was ‘not opposed to regulation in this area’. 
The SNP’s support of regulation contrary to its competitors’ opposition reflects an area of 
long-term competition between it and other parties; complaints from an SNP MP led to police 
investigations in the ‘cash for honours’ case. This also highlights the importance of 
opportunity versus costs in utilising voice, on both sides of the issue, thereby underlining that 
different issues can motivate different parties. Thus, the SNP took the opportunity to 
challenge its competitors, while the three statewide parties opposed further regulation for fear 
of additional costs. There is also occasionally explicit recognition from the Commission that 
representations to regulators can be an extension of party competition, as per the statement 
that ‘allegations of fraud can be an extension of the election campaign and are often made by 
candidates and supporters’ (Westminster panel, June 2012).            
Fourth, it is possible to detect attempts from parties to pushback against the impact of 
some regulation and legislation. A point often made in each of the panels is that reporting and 
compliance requirements are potentially difficult for volunteer treasurers in party accounting 
units to comply with. In the October 2009 Wales panel meeting, a discussion on enforcement 
policy made this point at length, highlighting the difficulty regulation posed for recruiting 
individuals to take up such roles. Similar points were made in the January 2009 Westminster 
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panel meeting in relation to new provisions in PPEA 2009. Green Party representatives have 
also argued that compliance is even more onerous on small parties (e.g. NI Panels, January 
2008 & April 2013). Similarly, on several occasions the view that the Commission has been 
requiring more information than statutorily necessary has been expressed (e.g. Westminster 
panel, Sept. 07, Welsh panel, January 08). All four panels raised concerns at the time about 
legislation permitting the appointment of Electoral Commissioners nominated by the parties. 
What are the implications? Discussions often demonstrate the paradoxical position of 
parties. Thus, in arguments against provisions in PPEA 2009, the introduction of ‘political’ 
commissioners and various other provisions, parties are paradoxically arguing, via the 
Commission, against various requirements that they themselves have the key influence in 
legislating for in parliament, where they could also introduce amendments and seek to change 
the legislation before it was enacted. This is demonstrated by discussion on PPEA 2009 in the 
Westminster panel in January 2009, where the Commission agreed to send parliament, where 
the parties were in the process of consulting on the Act’s provisions, a letter and report 
setting out the parties’ concerns, but which, curiously, ‘would not give the impression that the 
PPP had been consulted in detail’ (Item 3.11).  
Influence on regulators is notoriously hard to measure, even more so in the public 
version of minutes deployed here. Any observation that influence has resulted must be 
somewhat tentative. Such influence may not mean direct manipulation, but also the more 
nebulous, but legitimate, idea of taking the concerns of the regulated parties into account to 
ensure that regulation does not impose unreasonable costs. There is evidence of such 
influence in the panels’ minutes, often when enforcement policy is being discussed, with the 
Commission consulting parties about implementation. Thus, the Commission ‘recognised the 
reservations amongst the group’ when PPEA 2009 was being discussed (Westminster panel, 
January 2009), something which led to the report and letter mentioned above. Concern about 
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undue advantage gained by third party election material in the aftermath of local elections led 
parties on the Scottish panel (May 2012) to raise the issue of penalties for not having imprints 
on campaign material, which identify the agent legally responsible for the content, gaining 
the concession that there ‘needs to be some leeway in practice’. Most explicitly, in the Welsh 
panel meeting in October 2009, it was suggested that ‘sanctions … would only be used in 
extreme circumstances and the Commission would take into account any likely adverse 
impact on, for example, a party’s ability to campaign at an election’ (Item 5.4). This could be 
argued to put the interests of the regulated party above that of implementing legislation. It 
might however be argued that the democratic function is best served by such a permissive 
approach (Orr, 2012).  
High levels of compliance since 2010 have already been noted for mainstream parties. 
In terms of enforcement measures for breaches, parties were told that there would be ‘an 
informal response to low-level non-compliance and investigation for more serious cases’ and 
‘essentially … no civil penalty for statements of account submitted with formal defects’ 
(Westminster panels, November 2007 and March 2008). This is consistent with regulatory 
practice elsewhere. Nassmacher (2003: 147-153) notes a light sanctions regime in Canada 
and a similar approach with other EMBs. The UK Electoral Commission’s enforcement 
policy, updated after PPEA 2009 which extended the sanctions available to it, states that it 
prefers to use ‘advice and guidance’ to achieve compliance, and that: 
 
The Commission will take enforcement action where it is necessary and proportionate 
to do so. Many of the individuals responsible for complying with the law at local level 
are volunteers. It is therefore particularly important that the Commission’s objectives 
are pursued in a proportionate way, taking the facts of each case into account and only 
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taking action when it is necessary in order to achieve its objectives (Electoral 
Commission, 2010: 3). 
 
Mitigating circumstances and ‘reasonable excuses’ are generally permitted, acknowledged 
and accepted. Few sanctions appear to be imposed. Of 141 reviews into non-compliance 
between December 2010 and March 2012, 63 were found to be offences but no sanctions 
were imposed. Sanctions were imposed in only four cases, notably all relating to small parties 
(Electoral Commission, 2012).
9
            
This is not necessarily all one way traffic in favour of parties. There is evidence in the 
minutes of parties being put under pressure by the Commission to comply with regulations, to 
respond to consultations and to make suggestions for improvements to electoral practice. For 
example, there are suggestions that parties write to all candidates to ensure they attend pre-
election meetings with returning officers to be aware of issues around fraud (Westminster 
panel, June 2012), the Commission feeling the need to write to all parties in Northern Ireland 
to remind them of legal requirements (NI panel, April 2008), and discussion of a review of 
code of conduct for campaigners which indicates that ‘intimidation at polling stations is 
generated from a party base and therefore needs the involvement of parties to help set out 
what is acceptable behaviour’ (Westminster panel, Sept 2012, item 3.7).                              
 
Conclusion                 
 
The relationship between the political parties and the regulators who oversee them is crucial 
to the fairness of the electoral process. By examining the British case, this article’s major 
contribution has been to put this relationship centre stage to set out a framework for 
understanding how parties interact with their regulators. While the lack of recent 
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developments in the British party funding regime may suggest questions of party regulation 
have gone off the agenda, instead the argument presented here highlights limitations in the 
regulatory regime and the difficulties the regulator may face in pushing reform not supported 
on a cross-party basis. More generally, Ghaleigh (2012: 167) suggests that Britain has seen an 
‘ongoing contest between the regulator … and the regulated community, with the latter 
tirelessly probing the limits of the law’. Evidence here underlines this. However, it is more 
accurate to suggest that reaction varies from compliance, through various degrees of voice 
and regulatory capture, to parties trying to exploit loopholes, to, more rarely, an explicit 
rejection of various aspects of regulation. Such reaction takes place in both the institutional 
and extra-institutional environments and as a reaction to discontent with the regulatory 
regime and the costs it imposes. The little known about party-EMB relations suggests this is 
an important spectrum of behaviour which also needs to be applied and tested in comparative 
situations (Elmendorf, 2006; Nassmacher, 2003). Even if much discussion deals with quite 
technical electoral issues, the potential for influence is evident. Above all regulators need to 
be aware of the potential for undue influence. While this evidence comes from an advanced 
democracy, where regulators are relatively well resourced but essentially developing a new 
regime as they went, the potential for regulatory capture and for parties to argue against 
various provisions is evident. The danger in democratising regimes where EMBs are less 
well-resourced is that parties will dominate their regulator, thereby compromising electoral 
integrity and fair competition.       
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Figure 1: A Model of Party-Regulator Interaction 
Discontent  
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(Institutional) 
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Table 1: Issues discussed at Electoral Commission political parties panels (% meetings) 
 All NI Scotland Wales W/minster 
Legal Framework (E) 79 85 80 73 77 
Electoral Management 
(I) 
79 82 72 77 85 
Constituency 
demarcation (I) 
36 19 84 27 15 
Voter education (D) 60 52 76 77 39 
Voter registration (I) 86 96 64 96 89 
Ballot paper access & 
design (E) 
80 74 84 100 65 
Campaign & funding 
regulation (D) 
90 96 80 100 85 
Polling processes (E) 85 85 92 86 77 
Counting processes (E) 54 37 92 59 31 
Resolving disputes (I) 15 22 8 18 12 
Post-election 
procedures & reports 
(D) 
58 56 72 64 42 
Misc 45 44 24 82 35 
N of meetings 100 27 25 22 26 
Key: E: Essential; I: Important; D: Desirable. 
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1
 I am grateful to participants at the Australian PSA Conference workshop on ‘The Legal Regulation of Political 
Parties’ in Sept. 2014 and at PSA Annual Conference 2015 for their comments on an earlier version. I am also 
grateful to the referees for their insightful and helpful reviews. The usual disclaimer applies. 
2
 The regulatory capture literature refers to this as ‘squawk’ (Bo, 2006; Leaver, 2009). I stick with the better 
known term ‘voice’ throughout this paper, using it in an analogous way to ‘squawk’.    
3
 I am grateful to Dr Arianna Andreangeli for suggesting this. This point is not well recognised. Whiteley (2014) 
uses the undefined term ‘capture of the state’ and van Biezen and Kopecky (2014) use the term ‘capture’ to 
signify the use of patronage networks to place party loyalists in state bureaucracies.        
4
 Agrell and Gautier (2012) call this ‘soft’ capture.   
5
 Leaver (2009) refers to this as ‘minimal squawk behaviour’. 
6
 A confidence they clearly never had. 
7
 Risk profiles are available at: http://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/our-work/roles-and-
responsibilities/our-role-as-regulator-of-political-party-finances/risk-profiles [29/8/14]. 
8
 Minutes can be accessed at: http://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/our-work/who-we-are/governance-
and-decision-making [26/8/14]. 
9
 Respectively the English Democrats, People Before Profit Alliance, Christian Party ‘Proclaiming Christ’s 
Lordship’, and Veritas. I am not including here the more dramatic instances where police investigations have 
ensued. Often this is not because of referral by the Commission, but because other politicians have brought a 
complaint to the police as in the ‘cash for honours’ case. See Ghaleigh (2012) for discussion.  
